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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MILTON WINN, 
-vs.-
WILLIAM B. REID, 
Appellant, 
Respondent. 
Case 
No. 8575 
Respondent's Brief 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Respondent accepts the Appellant's statement 
of the facts except that Respondent throughout the brief, 
will at more appropriate times add to, and supplement 
said Appellant's statement. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT ONE 
THAT THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
FINDING THE PLAINTIFF (APPELLANT) NEGLI-
GENT AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY 
CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE APPELLANT'S 
INJURIES. 
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POINT TWO 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN FINDING 
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NEGLIGENT AND IN 
VIOLATION OF LAW, AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE 
REASON SAID PLAINTIFF WAS RIDING AND DIRECT-
ING IDS HORSE ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE IDGH-
WAY, TRAVELING AGAINST AND TOWARD ONCOM-
ING TRAFFIC AND THAT PERSONS RIDING HORSE-
BACK ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME RULES ON THE 
HIGHWAY, SO FAR AS IS POSSIBLE, AS VEHICULAR 
TRAFFIC AND THAT THE APPELLANT PROXIMATE-
LY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO HIS OWN INJURY J 
BY SO RIDING AND DRIVING ON THE IDGHWAY. I 
ARGU~IENT 
POINTS ONE and TWO 
The Court made findings that the : 
''Plaintiff caused his horse to move from the 
right hand side of the road to the left hand side 
of the road, and had straightened out and pro-
ceeded parallel with the road for about 30 rods 
when the accident occurred. That the Defendant 
operated his car into and against the rear end of 
the horse ... the Plaintff directed his animal over 
to the wrong side and along said left side ... " 
The further findings merely sa~· the Plaintiff, his 
horst' and the Defendant's vehicle were injured and 
dnmaged, and that both the Plaintiff and Defendant 
\H'rt' JIP~.dig-Pnt and that the negligence of each was the 
proximate ca ust> of the n'snlting accident, injuries and 
damngc. 
It is appan'nt t11e Court intended to rule that a 
horst> nnd rider using a. highway must usc the right side 
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of the road the same as vehicular traffic and the Court 
1~1 undoubtedly relied on Section 41-6-15, Utah Code Anno-
\lm tated, 1953, which section reads as follows: 
Gtl 
D~ "41-6-15. PERSONS RIDING OR DRIVING 
[: ANIMALS TO OBEY REGULATIONS.-Every 
If': person riding an animal or driving any animal-
~~ drawn vehicle upon a roadway shall be subject 
t to the provisions of this act applicable to the 
~, driver of a vehicle, except those provsions of this 
~~ act whch by their nature can have no application.'' 
~~( The respondent feels that the Court was entirely 
correct in holding the Appellant negligent and in viola-
tion of law for traveling on the left side of the highway. 
The Appellant of course claims that a horse and rider 
must travel in the left lane against traffic as required 
of pedestrians, and that is one of the issues being pre-
sented to the Court. 
:s Every person has a right to use the highway with 
any means of travel he desires not prohibited by law. 
1
" Each traveler, regardless of the means being used, must 
f 
~ exercise ordinary care so as not to endanger or injure 
themselves or others. (Butler vs. Cabe (Ark.), 171 s."T· 
1190-1.) In our Utah Motor Vehicle Code the legislature 
has quite completely regulated all types of two to four 
wheel vehicles whether motor driven or not. Our Code 
" provides specially for pedestrians in Section 41-6-82 (b), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, if of necessity they have to 
use the highways. But under no pretense could it even 
be suggested that this section applies to horses and 
riders. Especially is this so when we note our legislature 
specially classed all situations of horses being ridden or 
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driven, with vehicles. This is in the Section 41-6-15 
quoted above. Therefore, all persons' rights are equal 
on the highway, subject of course to the statutory regn. 
lations duly imposed by the legislature. 
The Appellant on page 8 of his brief quotes our 
Supreme Court in the case of Dalley vs. Midwestern 
Dairy Products Company, 15 Pac. 2nd 309, as suggesting 
that the trial court in this case was wrong merely becuase 
the court said that men on horseback and in horse drawn 
vehicles at that tinte were not required to disclose a light. 
That is not our problem but may we point out that that 
case was decided in 1932 and the section of law in issue 
was passed in 1941. 
The State of California (Sec. 452 in California 
Vehicle Code) and the State of Oregon (Sec. 115-305 
Ore. Comp. Laws) have identical statutes with Utah 
except that they include bicycles with horses and use the 
same conditions and restrictions. (See Sec. 275, Calif . 
• Jurisprudence 2nd on .\.utomobiles.) :Jiany cases from 
these two states repeat the rule that in nearly all require-
ments, like, using the right side of road, signaling, care 
and many others, bicycles must be regulated by the same 
rnlt>s as automobiles. It is to be noted that horseback 
ridtlrs are in thl" same section of, and put in the same 
~]ass h~·, the law. (St't' Finn· Ys. Beeshau (Calif.), 33 
Pac. 2nd 1033; 17~ .A.L.R .. 736, 732, 733.) In the case of 
\\'right n~. Sniffen (Calif.), 181 Pac. 2nd 675-77 the 
( 1alifornia Supreme Court in interpreting its statute, 
Ht•ct ion 4;,~, which includes horses and bicycles without 
distinguishing hc.•twcl'll them says that a "vehicle" is 
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''that in or on which a person or thing is er may be 
carried.'' 
The Respondent is unable to find a case actually in 
point, but has found the following cases which we hope 
will be helpful to the Court. We feel that they summarize 
' the law into the following points: 
1. A man on horseback is not a pedestrian and 
should travel on the right side of the highway instead 
of the left side. 
2. Under the rule of reasonable caution and equal 
rights on the highway a person riding a horse should be 
controlled by, and be able to meet, any variance in the 
many circumstances and situations that are possible so 
·· as to always act in the greatest of safety. 
3. Horseback riders don't usually require lights, 
but depending on the circumstances, such as light, dark-
ness, curves, sight obstructions, etc., care should always 
be exercised even if the rider had to use partially or 
exclusively the right shoulder of the highway. 
As indicated above, Oregon has a law similar to our 
Utah law. In the case of Sertic vs. McCullough (Ore.), 
63 Pac. 2nd 884, 887, we have a person walking and 
leading two horses on the left side of ·the road. The 
Court said that they would not find him contributorily 
negligent merely because he was leading the horses on 
the left side of the road. The Court said this Plaintiff 
was a pedestrian, he was not riding a horse or in any 
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vehicle, therefore he didn't have to be on the right side 
of the road. We realize it is not exactly in point but we 
suggest it because it at least discusses the problem and 
does make the point that only a pedestrian must travel 
on the left side. This case is quoted and followed in 
other later cases. 
A very lengthy opinion, written in 1945, goes into 
the problem in the case of Lawson vs. Fordyce (Iowa), 
21 N.W. 2nd 69. This was a case of a person leading a 
cow on the right side of the road. This court refused to 
apply the pedestrian rule and said the person leading 
the cow belonged on the right side. The Court's reasons 
as to why are interesting. The Court said: 
"(Pge. 83) ... it is a matter of common 
knowledge that the safest place for a pedestrian 
to travel is near the extreme edge of the roadway 
on his left side, for in that place he need not 
watch the traffic from the rear and is facing the 
oncoming traffic and can step to the left on the 
shoulder to avoid it. . . . (Pge. 84) In the hy-
pothetical situation we have suggested an unen-
cumbered walker might escape by jumping to his 
left, but a person leading a cow or other domstic 
animal, or driving one, or driving a harnessed 
but unhitched horse or team would \ery likely be 
unsu('cessful in getting the frightened animal or 
animals to jump with him. The result would 
probahly be a ('atastrophe for all concerned. We 
doubt n'rr mucl1 tlmt the legislatures of the 
s tnt l~s men toned intended such statutory provi-
sions to apply to pt'rsons on foot and in charge of 
horses, ('OWS, and other livestock upon tl1e high-
waYs .... (Pge. 8;)) (Pedestrians are those who 
uw)· nst) the sidl'Walks, certainly animals are not 
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allowed on sidewalks so the law for pedestrians 
does not apply where a person in is charge of 
animals.) So far as our research has disclased, no 
court by dictum or decision has ever said, and 
no text writer ... has ever interpreted these sta-
tutes as including a person on foot leading or 
otherwise in charge of one or more cows, horses, 
mules, hogs, sheep, etc. on the highway.'' 
The Respondent humbly submits that since the en-
actment of Section 41-6-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
in 1941, horseback riders must use the right side of the 
highway along with vehicles. The law clearly so states 
and even the use of that side must be done with care 
depending on the circumstances even to the extent of 
getting off onto the right shoulder when cars approach 
and pass from the rear. The above cases submitted by 
the Respondent also point out that all interpretations of 
laws similar to our Utah law uphold the principle that 
horseback riders must use the right hand side of the 
road. 
Even though there were certain points of conflict 
in the evidence presented in, and, which had to be sorted 
and resolved by the lower court, said Court had to make 
a decision and findings and naturally thereby positively 
rejected certain bits of evidence. The positive findings 
included time and place and found that both the Appel-
lant and the Respondent were riding and operating "on 
the left hand side of the same road'' going in the same 
direction. That the Appellant had travelled 30 rods on 
the left side "when the accident occurred." BUT THE 
COURT MADE NO SPECIFIC FINDINGS AS TO 
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WHERE ON THE ROAD THE RESPONDENT HAD 
BEEN TRAVELING EXCEPT TO SAY THAT HIS 
CAR HAD BEEN GOING NORTH AND HIT THE 
REAR END OF THE HORSE. 
The Court then further found both Appellant and 
Respondent negligent for both being on the wrong side 
of the road and that the negligence of each was the 
proximate cause of their own injuries and damage. 
It is only natural to assume that the Court gave full 
consideration and credance to any other testimony intro-
duced at the trial, not specifically in conflict with the 
above findings, and if the full picture of such testimony 
could give to the court reasonable grounds for its find-
ings, said findings of the Court and its decree should be 
upheld and affirmed and no new trial granted. This 
honorable Court has frequently held that even though 
there be a conflict in the testimony, or even though this 
Court might have held otherwise had they been the 
Judge or Judges in the lower court, this Court cannot 
disturb but must uphold the findings of the lower court 
unless the lower court was clearly wrong and had no 
<''·idence to support said findings. 
~t't': 
y owell n'. Oceidental Life Ins. Co., 110 Pac. 2nd 
566-1: 100 Ptah 1~0. 
Bear Hin'r ~tnk Bank Ys. l\Ierrill, 120 Pac. 2nd 
:~~;-)-7: 101 Utah 176. 
Ercanbrack n:. Ellison, 134 Par. 2nd 177-8: 103 
lTtab 138. 
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'I ~· 
'); ~ 
Palfreyman vs. Bates and Rogers, 158 Pac. 2nd 
315-23; 119 Utah 529. 
Garrett Freight Lines vs. Cornwall, 232 Pac. 2nd 
786-9; 120 Utah 175. 
Douglas vs. Duvall, 304 Pac. 2nd 373-4; 5 Utah 
2nd 429. 
Respondent submits and repeats that the lower 
court doesn't presume in the least way to find or estab-
lish through its findings the details of how or where the 
accident occurred. We again refer to the Court's find-
ings above. These findings are very general and cer-
tainly must be leaving the details to the record. Respon-
dent submits that there is great conflict in this case as 
to the claims being made but there is no conflict in the 
ultimate details of this accident. About the only impor-
tant point of conflict in the testimony of the two parties 
is the point at which the Appellant caused his horse to 
cross over the highway. Respondent's testimony was to 
the effect that the horse crossed over just prior to the 
accident. (R. 73-74). This theory was apparently re-
jected by the Court but in the other important details 
Respondent claims there is no serious conflict. 
~lay we briefly point out to the Court the details 
back of the Court's general findings. PLEASE NOTE 
THAT ALL THE FOLLOWING FACTS COME EX-
CLUSIVELY FROM THE TESTIMONY OF Tl!E 
APPELLANT'S OWN WITNESSES. The Appellant 
was riding a brown horse (R. 27). The accident hap-
pened after sundown, just at dusk, and the Respondent 
had the lights on his car (R. 47, 48, 73). The Respon-
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dent's car came to rest at a 22.5 degree angle in the 
west lane headed in a northwest direction, the left front 
wheel being six inches, and the left rear wheel being four 
feet from the west edge of the hard surface of the high-
way (R. 48, 49). The Respondent's right front wheel 
was one to two feet from the center line (R. 43). The 
Respondent skidded and left tire marks of 48 feet be-
ginning from a point where the marks about straddled 
the center line and headed generally in a northwest direc-
tion to the point above indicated (R. 40, 42). The tracks 
were measured from the rear end where the tracks of 
the rear wheels started, to the front end where the tracks 
of the front wheels ended. The Respondent's car had 
four wheel brakes and measured 10% feet between the 
wheels thereby cutting the actual skid to about 38 feet 
(R. 79 to 89). That the point of impact set by the dirt, 
debris and glass was at a point at and under the rear 
end of the car as it stood when the right rear wheel was 
four feet from the west edge of the road. This would 
place the point of impact abou-t six feet east of th.e 1rest 
cd.Qf' nf the road (R. 49, lines 5-6). This cannot be dis-
puted, it is the testimony of the Appellant's own witness, 
and it is in absolute harmony with all the other testimony 
of the Appellant's witnesses and was beyond doubt 
arrepted hy the Court. Therefore, it appears that we 
find the R-espondent., after he discovers his peril and puts 
on hi~ hrakt'S, skidding 38 ftlet from the east lane to the 
wPst laJH' to u,·oid some peril and it must haYe been the 
Appellant's horse because our collision was with the 
Appellant's horsl' in the west lane six feet from the west 
10 
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edge of the road. This is undisputed and the Court made 
no finding contrary to it. 
Therefore, looking at all the evidence of the case the 
lower Court must have accepted the fact that the Re-
spondent was driving northward just prior to the acci-
dent, at least substantially in his own lane of traffic. 
The indisputable physical facts put the Respondent in 
said lane, the Court made no contrary findings and 
couldn't be disputed by the Court. The i.ndisputable facts 
are that the Respondent was confronted by a sudden 
peril and skidded at least 38 feet into the Appellant and 
his horse. The Respondent gave an absolutely consistent 
reason for those skid marks by maintaining and testi-
fying that the horse appeared suddenly before him cross-
ing from the east to the west (R. 73, 74), and Respondent 
tried to avoid hitting the horse by veering to his left 
and putting on his brakes. The Court rejected the por-
tion of the evidence that the horse crossed over the high-
way from the east but the Court made no findings de-
nouncing, amending or rejecting the physical facts of 
the Respondent skidding diagonally from the east to the 
west side of the highway. The only finding of the Court 
was that the Respondent was on the west and wrong side 
of the road with his automobile "without just cause or 
excuse." So ultimately we find both the Appellant and 
Respondent on the wrong side of the road. The Court 
finds them both wrong in being there. Apparently the 
Court felt the Appellant was there by deliberate action 
and the Respondent got there because of some sudden 
action or peril which caused the said Respondent to veer 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his car to the wrong side of the highway. Under these 
circumstances both would have to be wrong. One couldn't 
be negligent and the other not. 
THESE FACTS PUT BOTH PARTIES ON THE 
WRONG SIDE OF THE ROAD, BOTH NEGLIGENT 
OR IN VIOLATION OF LAW, AND CERTAINLY 
BOTH SUPPLYING OR CONTRIBUTING TO THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF BOTH THEffi INJURIES 
AND LOSSES. CERTAINLY IF THE APPELLANT 
HAD BEEN COMPLYING WITH THE LAW THE 
ACCIDENT WOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED. 
If the Appellant had been on the hard surface on 
his side the undisputed evidence is that the Respondent 
in moving to the left would have avoided the accident 
and certainly if the Appellant had been on the right 
shoulder of the admitted six feet width there would have 
been no accident. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent submits that: 
1. The Appellant was violating the law by riding 
his horsP on the left side of the highway. 
2. This violation wns the proximate cause of the 
Appellant·~ injuries and losses. 
~- IIad tlw Appellant been complying with the law 
he would han• received no injuries or losses. 
12 
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4. For these reasons the judgment of the lower 
Court should be affirmed, and that the alternate requests 
of the Appellant for either a new trial or for a direction 
to the lower Court to fix damages be both denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. N. OTTOSEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
65 East 4th South- Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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